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Abstract 
We challenge recent findings by Abiad and Mody (2005) which suggest that financial 
liberalization has little to do with political variables. This analysis is at odds with some of the 
established literature, and only with difficulty comes to terms with the considerable cross-
national variation in the pace, phasing, and extent of financial reforms over time. Using Abiad 
and Mody’s own index of financial liberalization, but slightly unbundling and refining their 
measures of ‘ideological affinity’ and ‘regime type’, we examine what Abiad and Mody call 
the ‘triggers’ of liberalisation and the dynamics of the subsequent ‘cumulative 
transformation’. We demonstrate the role of political variables in relation to initial 
liberalisation episodes, and as variables affecting the cumulative dynamics and sustainability 
of ongoing financial reform processes, including those which affect the acceptability and 
costs of liberalization.  These factors include (i) shifts to – as opposed to levels in – Left 
government; (ii) the incidence of Left governments combined with low levels of democracy; 
(iii) international voter support for free markets; (iv) the extent of social safety nets; (v) the 
presence of multilateral and bilateral aid programs. Our empirical investigation confirms these 
factors as statistically significant determinants of financial liberalization, and reveal what 
















  11. Introduction 
Global financial openness remains a politically fragile and contested dynamic, as the 
reaction to the current sub-prime crisis clearly demonstrates.  It follows that there are sound 
reasons to enhance understanding of these dynamics through ongoing research into the 
political economy of financial openness as a key face of economic globalization.  A recent 
and important contribution to this literature is Abiad and Mody’s (2005) study of the 
determinants of financial liberalization, based on a rich new dataset of policy measures, which 
encapsulate six different aspects of financial reforms. Abiad and Mody’s explanation of the 
timing, pace, and extent of financial reforms and consequent origins of financial liberalization 
stands out as remarkably apolitical.  Their core argument and empirical findings highlight 
how increasing-returns become locked-in through learning effects.  The initial step to 
liberalization is difficult and is typically sparked by economic shocks, but this policy 
breakthrough yields information and footholds for deepening liberalization over time which 
are related to the spatial dynamics of “catching-up” with the most liberalized countries in their 
region.  A number of plausible political factors which previous studies found had played an 
important role in shaping financial globalization – such as left-right partisanship or 
democratic institutions – are found to have little influence on the particular measures of 
financial liberalization in the wide range of countries and time-periods covered by the study. 
While Abiad and Mody’s conclusions make an important contribution to our 
understanding of the broad trend towards reform of the past fifteen years or more, we argue 
that refined and additional variables better explain the cross-national variation within the 
trend itself.  Given that economic shocks and regional-international pressures related to 
learning usually affect a number of countries simultaneously, their findings appear to 
contribute less to understanding the considerable cross-national variation in the pace, phasing, 
and eventual extent of domestic reforms.  In turn, analysing the comparative dynamics across 
national processes is likely to lead to a better general understanding of the longer-run 
sustainability and political underpinnings of financial openness.   
In this paper we seek to re-examine the role that political variables might play in 
shaping Abiad and Mody’s measures of financial liberalization.  We demonstrate the role of 
political variables in relation to initial liberalisation episodes, and as variables affecting the 
cumulative dynamics and sustainability of ongoing financial reform processes, including 
those which affect the acceptability and costs of liberalization.  In order to deepen the 
analysis, we employ Abiad and Mody’s own methodology, dataset and index of financial 
liberalisation, while unbundling and refining some of their key variables subsumed under 
  2‘ideological affinity’ and ‘regime type’.  We focus on how national policy choices on 
financial liberalization might be significantly affected by both domestic-national and 
international political variables relevant to the “input” and “output” sides or ‘phases’ of the 
processes generating financial openness.  Input concerns process: the involvement of and 
acceptance by stakeholders of the decision to initiate (or continue with/reverse) financial 
liberalisation.  The output side concerns the substantive effects of such policy change on the 
perceived interests of stakeholders, whatever their involvement and acceptance of initial or 
ongoing policy change. 
Our analysis (see figure 1) reveals that these factors influence significantly and 
directly the chances that governments may liberalize their financial markets, and the 
interaction of these factors underpins the domestic learning and catch-up dynamics 
emphasized by Abiad and Mody.  With respect to the input side, we find both domestic and 
international-level political variables to be relevant to liberalization.  The domestic factors are 
two-fold.  First, shifts towards (as opposed to levels of) Left governments significantly 
decrease chances of liberalization.  Second, both changes and incidence of Left government 
affect liberalization in ways strongly mediated by democratic representation: different levels 
of democracy affect the policy options and credibility concerns of parties, such that at low 
levels of democracy, moves to and incidence of Left governments tend to significantly 
decrease chances of liberalization, while in more democratic settings this negative effect of 
Left representation disappears.  The regional/international factors relevant to the input phase 
are measures of the overall level of external, international voter and stakeholder support for 
e.g. free-market enterprise, international openness, and internationalism generally, versus 
voter support for e.g. (post-) Communist parties, Marxist ideology, and international closure.  
Liberalization is significantly more likely when the international, extra-national zeitgeist and 
institutions support free-market openness and less likely to the extent that it supports anti-
market closure.  Finally, both the domestic and international input factors may also mediate 
the output-side learning-based lock-in and catch-up dynamics Abiad and Mody emphasize – 
shifts towards left government have fewer negative effects on liberalisation as ex ante 
financial openness increases, and as international voter-support for free markets significantly 
spurs a catch-up effect. 
With respect to the output side, we explore the hypothesis that financial liberalization 
is more likely when accompanied by domestic and international spending programs that help 
address the internal distributional costs and risks of financial markets.  Once again, there was 
a domestic and an international dimension.  Firstly, while domestic systems of compensation 
  3might increase political support for international openness, we find that not all aspects of 
social and welfare policy increase the chances of financial liberalization.  Specifically, while 
various measures of total spending are found to have only a modest influence, health spending 
(which in a developing-country context provides more generalized indemnification of risk 
than social security expenditures) appears to correlate to liberalization.  International sources 
of compensation – measured as bilateral developmental assistance, multilateral development 
assistance, and technical assistance – may not only involve conditionality that demands 
liberalization but may also help address social policy risks beyond domestic capacity.  We 
find that such “social insurance from without” tends to significantly increase liberalization 
chances.  There is some modest evidence that domestic, though not international, sources of 
compensation may decrease the catch-up effect identified by Abiad and Mody.  Catch-up and 
learning as processes are found to be heavily mediated by political variables.  
 
Figure One: input and output/domestic international dimensions 
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  4We develop these points in three sections, building on and refining Abiad and Mody’s 
study.  The first section summarises the basic specification of their study and their findings on 
political variables.  The second section considers alternative specifications, unbundling some 
of those variables which address domestic left partisanship and democracy, as well as 
international embrace of free markets, as possible input sources of change.  The third section 
considers output-side specifications focused on domestic spending and international aid as 
potential sources of sustainability of liberal reforms.  Our final section summarises and 
concludes by highlighting a broader research agenda to explore the long-run political 
underpinnings of financial liberalization. 
 
1. Abiad and Mody’s analysis: a case of disappearing politics  
Abiad and Mody’s study employs a new data index of financial openness.
1  That 
political variables might matter is clearly one of the hypotheses they set out to test, and the 
approach is not a priori likely to generate the finding that political variables play little role.  
However, their characterisation of political variables, and certainly their empirical analysis, 
all yield such a conclusion.  Their starting point is that breaking the status quo to begin a 
process of financial liberalization is a difficult and rare event, usually induced under the 
impulse of exogenous economic shocks such as currency crises, recessions, or IMF-
conditionality.  Once begun, however, a dynamic process emerges: the early stages of 
liberalization are marked by increasing-returns that may become locked-in through learning 
effects, while at later stages liberalization reaches a sort of saturation point, tending towards 
diminishing marginal returns.  They also find that this lock-in learning dynamic is conditioned 
by a range of other factors, not just the starting point of liberalization but also existing levels 
of economic development and external conditions such as currency crises.  Finally, they 
follow the lead of other scholars who have given attention to spatial interdependence 
(Simmons and Elkins 2004; Franzese and Hays 2006), and expect that polities will tend to try 
to catch up with the levels of financial openness of their region’s most open regional polity. 
Abiad and Mody make sense of these developments in essentially apolitical terms: national 
reform, in turn embedded in the regional patterns of liberalization in the region, sensitizes 
policymakers to the economic benefits of financial integration by yielding information and 
material benefits for deepening liberalization over time.   
                                                 
1 Their dataset is a new 18-point composite measure of six areas of financial openness for 35 countries between 
1973 and 1997, each capturing liberalization of the following aspects of finance (0-3, with 3 being most open):  
(1) capital controls/reserve requirements; (2) interest rate controls; (3) entry barriers, pro-competition measures; 
(4) regulations of securities markets; (5) privatization in the financial sector; and (6) international transactions. 
  5Perhaps contrary to their own anticipations as revealed by the initial inclusion of 
political variables, Abiad and Mody find a very limited role for the several plausible political 
factors which previous studies have found important in shaping financial globalization.  They 
consider particularly the role of left, right or centre governments – employing the Database on 
Political Institutions, where governments are coded based on broad content and rhetoric of 
government policies with respect to public intervention in their economies.  Abiad and Mody 
anticipate that Left governments might be more opposed to liberalization than right 
governments because the former should disproportionately represent the likely losers of 
globalization.  But they also anticipate that left governments might also have more political 
credibility to pursue such reforms than their right-party counterparts because such reform can 
be more credibly sold as in a national rather than a party’s ideological interest.  Their 
empirical results demonstrate consistently that left, centre or right government tend to matter 
little in shaping changes in financial openness – either directly influencing change or in 
interaction with various crisis conditions or with ex ante levels of financial openness.
2   
These findings contrast with those of a number of other studies into financial 
liberalization, including quantitative studies of capital account liberalization and openness.  
For example, Quinn and Inclan (1997) found that left partisanship tends to – à la Stolper and 
Samuelson – interact with levels of economic development, such that left partisanship spurs 
liberalization in developing countries but thwarts it in richer countries.  Abiad and Mody also 
reach conclusions in contrast to other studies of financial globalization that focus on a range 
of more or less elite struggles among economic sectors of finance, bureaucratic struggles, 
historical accidents, and spillovers from other areas of economic and political globalization 
(e.g. Sobel 1998; Laurence 2001; Garrett 2001; Helleiner 1994). 
To be fair, applying the specifications from these other studies to Abiad and Mody’s 
framework tends to suggest that partisanship matters less in relation to their measures of 
short-term changes for their set of countries and years.  For instance, left partisanship does not 
interact with various measures of economic development or factor endowments – and we 
considered a range of measures of capital-labour ratios, labour productivity, capital 
productivity, and GDP per capita, all as proxies for factor profile that might mediate the 
influence of partisanship.  None of these measures yield consistently significant results.  And 
in fact the consistent pattern is actually in the direction opposite to Stolper-Samuelson 
expectations, albeit usually statistically insignificant:  higher levels of development tend to 
                                                 
2 Other political factors, especially institutional characteristics like quality of democracy and legislative 
fragmentation are also found to be empirically insignificant in shaping liberalization politics. 
  6make left government more rather than less likely to introduce financial liberalization.  This 
pattern, incidentally, holds even if one considers levels rather than changes in financial 
openness.
3  But it could be an artefact, again, of the particular measure of financial 
liberalization, or of the data coverage.  In any event, Abiad and Mody’s findings on the 
insignificance of partisanship have a reasonable basis, even beyond their estimation approach. 
Abiad and Mody’s study therefore raises big and important questions about the role of 
politics in financial liberalization, with important and counter-intuitive implications for our 
understanding of the longer-run policy dynamics of liberalisation.  If Abiad and Mody are 
correct, then liberalization is a path which is difficult and often painful to stumble upon, but 
its positive nature becomes clear once the process has begun, as the benefits of openness are 
increasingly manifested.  Stimulated by shocks, policy-makers taking the correct initial 
technical decision, to reform through liberalisation, link up with the locomotive of learning 
and policy is on track. 
However, if it were the case that liberalization has its origins in specific political 
conditions (whether or not initially stimulated by economic shocks), then both the explanation 
of its origins (input) as well as our understanding of the longer-run dynamics of openness 
(output) must be altered.  We know that markets are dynamic and that these dynamics imply a 
range of differentially-distributed adjustment costs and benefits for agents and constituencies 
over time.  The conditions which initiate decisions to liberalize may not be the same as the 
conditions which take the policy further or render the policy politically sustainable in the long 
term.  So this apparently simple point - does financial openness have political origins or not? - 
is central to our broader understanding of the relationship between the openness of financial 
systems and their governance.   
Given the common intuition that political/distributional inputs to decisive changes in 
policy are likely to prove important, and supported by the findings of other studies, we argue 
that there are good reasons to delve deeper into the political variables employed in the Abiad 
and Mody study.  Their findings leave little room for the discussion of cross-national 
variation in political or economic costs and benefits of policy change, yet we know that 
liberalization may represent a policy solution for some, and a significant disadvantage for 
others.  Moreover, it is not clear from their analysis that all paths leading to liberalisation or 
                                                 
3 Abiad and Mody’s focus on first-difference changes in, rather than levels of, financial openness is appropriate 
as a statistical matter, because the measures all show (individually and in composite) strong signs of non-
stationarity in the dataset.  Even if this narrows the possible focus to more short-term dynamics of liberalization, 
thus, taking changes on the LHS is pretty much essential, requiring a dynamic model of some form, either their 
ordered logit with the robust-cluster “sandwich” estimator of standard errors, or an error-correction model, or 
some other approach able to address panel (country) and temporal correlation, and heteroskedasticity.   
  7even the end result are the same, particularly in distributional terms.  Case research reveals 
that each move along the continuum between financial repression and openness seldom takes 
place in the same way, even in the wake of the same crisis (Underhill and Zhang 2003, chs. 5-
6).  Even though similar forces may be at work, there is considerable cross-country variation 
in the experience of crisis and liberalization and in the pace, phasing and extent of reforms, 
especially in terms of the political compromises produced, and national experiences of 
themselves admit of variation over time (Moran 1990; Coleman 1996).  Little is said of the 
longer-run political costs of financial instability which may be linked to openness itself, 
despite a considerable literature linking market liberalization to increased market volatility 
(Prasad, Rajan, and Subramainiam, 2007; Bhagwati 1998; Arestis and Demetriades, 1999).  
Most importantly, the study employs relatively broad and simplified measures of what 
constitute the most important political variables (essentially left-right orientation of 
government, and parliamentary vs. presidential regime type) and how they might be employed 
in the model.  There is little attention to the deeper phenomena of constituency rivalry and 
interest politics, nor to how these might play out in relation to initial liberalisation and over 
time.  We argue that Abiad and Mody’s broad notions of politics should therefore be 
unbundled and applied systematically in terms of the input phase (initial decisions to 
implement liberal policies) versus the dynamics of the output phase (the dynamics of 
‘learning’ played out among constituencies over time).  This in turn raises the question of the 
longer-run sustainability of financial openness in relation to the broader policy mix. 
The remainder of this paper focuses on particular political variables in relation to the 
input and output sides/phases of financial liberalization and across the domestic/international 
dimensions (see Figure one again), variables that we believe are relevant to the shorter-term 
decisions to liberalize as well as to broader issues of sustainability or more complex notions 
of politics.  We employ a relatively simple set of domestic and international factors that we 
think highly relevant to the political economy of globalization and that we expect and 
empirically find to be important to shaping financial liberalization. 
 
2. Input 
The input side or phase of liberalisation concerns the involvement of and acceptance 
by stakeholders in policy-making.  In the case of financial opening, we posit that this means 
not just aggregate voter preferences but also the involvement of stakeholders, including firms, 
workers and other socio-economic groups, in policy “decisions” to liberalize the financial 
system.  As such, we need to find aggregate-level measures as ‘proxies’ for the involvement 
  8and interests of stakeholders and constituencies. These could for example be captured by 
broad patterns of domestic democratic representation, implying at least passive involvement 
of stakeholders.  But this might also involve more direct involvement in a policy decision – as 
opposed to de facto decision-making by bureaucrats unfettered by democratic accountability.  
The input phase might involve, particularly in democratic settings, less direct and formally 
protected representation through partisan orientation of governments.  Finally, the input side 
involves the general underlying support for a particular policy change, both domestically 
within a given polity or internationally in terms of broader world opinion about such change.
4   
In our exploration of the role that political variables might play in shaping financial 
liberalization, we find that examples of these ‘sinews of input’ have a significant influence on 
changes in Abiad and Mody’s six-policy measure of financial governance.  The results are 
summarized in Table One.  In this and the following table (on issues relevant to output 
legitimacy), we use as the benchmark Abiad and Mody’s specification from column four of 
their Table Eight, because this specification is the first of those where lagged levels of 
financial regulation are interacted with policy measures that might influence the lock-in 
effects of learning.
5   Column One shows the estimation we will take as the benchmark.  The 
most important results, well discussed in the Abiad and Mody paper, are that there does seem 
to be an emerging lock-in learning effect that displays increasing returns (linking our input 
and output phases), captured by the significant positive effect of lagged levels of financial 
openness and the negative and significant effect of the square term.  Also noteworthy is the 
significantly positive interaction between GDP per capita (on PPP basis) and lagged 
liberalization, suggesting that desired liberalization is higher among richer countries.   
Furthermore, the “catch-up” parameter – measured as the difference between the level of 
financial openness of the region’s most liberalized financial system and the country’s own 
level of openness – is modestly significantly positive, suggesting that the chance of 
liberalization increases with the extent that a country lags behind regional liberalizers.   
Finally, balance-of-payments currency crises positively affect chances of liberalizing, while 
banking crises and levels of US interest rates tend to reduce such chances (input phase).  Key 
for us, however, is that incidence of left and right governments (with center governments as 
the excluded category) have no significant influence on chances of liberalization. 
                                                 
4 As time goes on, the issue of underlying support takes on the characteristics of the output side as outlined 
below. 
5 We hasten to emphasize, however, that our own results are robust to the various other specifications in their 
study – for instance with the cruder measure of lock-in, with the more drawn-out specification with many more 
interactions, and the estimations without country fixed effects.   
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[[Table One about here]] 
 
2.1. Shifts in government.  Our first example of how input conditions might matter 
more than the ‘benchmark’ suggests concerns the influence of left, right and centre 
governments and issues of economic intervention on the chances of liberalization.  Abiad and 
Mody’s study only characterises the ‘ideological affinity’ of government as the incidence of 
left, right or centre parties.  Yet, the ideological affinity of governments might also matter to 
policy changes by virtue of a change in power from one party to another.  A new government 
may be freshly empowered, providing extra stimulus to policy change and yielding short-term 
changes in levels of financial liberalization.  Indeed, Abiad and Mody anticipate this 
possibility when they discuss the “’new government’ or ‘honeymoon’ hypothesis,” such as 
Krueger’s finding based on case research that one of the most important conditions for 
liberalization is that a new government comes to power (see AD, p.72, citing Krueger 1993, 
p.124).  Although Abiad and Mody also cite reasons to think that shifts in power might not 
spark reform, as new governments delay painful policies until they have consolidated power 
(c.f. Haggard and Webb 1993), the hypothesis and case histories of “new government” 
suggest that shifts in government may matter as much as, or at least in ways distinct from, 
incidence of government.  These possibilities lead Abiad and Mody to consider a dummy for 
first-year-of office of a government, in addition to partisanship of government.  But this 
specification does not address the possibility that different governments might act differently 
in their first year of office. 
Taking account of such developments in the empirical investigation might involve, 
most simply and minimally, considering how first-differences of partisanship affect first-
difference changes in levels of financial liberalization.
6  Our general expectation might be that 
– possible Stolper-Samuelson effects notwithstanding – a shift to left governments (captured 
by a positive one in first differences) should decrease the chance of liberalization while a shift 
away from left governments to either centre or right governments (captured by a negative one 
in first-differences) should increase the chance of liberalization.  One might also hypothesize 
that the opposite pattern ought to emerge with changes in right government control. 
Column one of Table One captures how this is broadly what one finds for changes in 
left partisanship, though not significantly for changes in right partisanship – both, as in the 
                                                 
6 We remove from the RHS dummy for first-year-of-rule, though leaving this in yields virtually the same results. 
  10incidence models, having effects that can be discerned relative to a shift to centre 
governments.  The shift to left governments, in particular, significantly decreases the chances 
that a polity will liberalize.  Substantively, this effect can be captured by counterfactual 
estimates of how moving from no left government to a shift to left government affects 
predicted changes in openness, holding other parameters at their means.  Such a shift 
increases the likelihood of a reduction of openness by 5.6 percentage points (from a 
probability of .024 to a probability of .08), and of there being no change by 6.7 percentage 
points (from probability .795 to .862), and decreases the chance of liberalization (a little or a 
lot) by 11 percentage points (from a probability of .177 to .067). 
Column (3) suggests, further, that the shift to left governments might have effects 
mediated by ex ante levels of financial openness.  In particular, the individual coefficient for 
first-difference in left government suggests that at levels of full closure of financial markets (a 
score of 0 on the Abiad and Mody scale), a shift to left government predicts a significant 
reduction of chances of liberalization, on a scale roughly double for that just reported for 
column (2).  But as financial openness becomes greater, this negative effect significantly 
declines – becoming insignificant once a country reaches a level of financial openness 
equivalent to .52 liberalization on the rescaled 0 to 1 measure of openness (0 being full 
closure and 1 being full openness). 
2.2. Left government and Democracy:  Columns (4) and (5) consider a second aspect 
of input legitimacy, where the incidence of left government appears to significantly interact 
with levels of democracy in shaping chances of liberalization.  As Abiad and Mody report, 
levels of democracy as well as partisanship generally appear to be insignificant predictors of 
liberalization.  But levels of democracy might well alter the calculations of specific political 
parties in the kinds of policies they pursue, and this alteration might play out differently for 
left than for right or centre parties – all net of economic development and other conditions.
7  
It is also possible that democratization might play out differently in different partisan settings 
– though government colour tends to vary more than levels of democracy as an institution.   
Our general expectation is not strong here, since intuition and previous theory suggests 
offsetting possibilities.  On the one hand, if left governments are more likely to oppose 
                                                 
7 Stolper-Samuelson considerations might predict that left governments decrease liberalization in non-
democracies but be less so inclined in more democratic settings, since the sample is skewed to non-OECD 
developing countries, where democratization might make left parties more inclined to act for their (presumably) 
working-class constituencies.  We might thus expect left government to become less negative and more positive 
with democratization.  But there is no evidence of general Stolper-Samuelson effects, as discussed above.  And 
limiting the sample to democracies shows patterns that, if anything, go against such effects:  right parties support 
liberalization in labor-abundant settings and become less inclined to do so as factor profiles shift to capital-
abundant.  In any event, factor-profile difference is partly controlled-for with the GDP-per-capita parameter. 
  11liberalization to help constituents (a pattern that holds for the shifts to left governments), then 
one might expect democratization to reinforce the electoral incentives thus to act because 
democratic governments are more likely to be held accountable for their actions.  Left 
governments might also tend to oppose financial liberalization because of state control over 
finance and financial institutions, in which case the effects of democratization ought to be 
more neutral.  There is however a further and offsetting possibility that democratization will 
reduce left parties’ incentives to protect financial markets.  Democratization brings with it 
accountability to a broad range of constituents, beyond traditional left or right coalitions of 
interests.  Parties positioning themselves to attract the median voter may consciously aim 
outside their traditional clientele, unleashing new ways of thinking about and serving both 
traditional and ‘new’ constituents. For example, a left government might seek to broaden its 
constituency by promoting ‘national interest’ policies aimed at non-working class 
constituencies, while simultaneously strengthening and targeting compensation provisions to 
their traditional working-class clients.  As levels of wealth change, constituents may 
reinterpret their perceived interests and governments seeking to bridge gaps among 
constituents may use policy to stimulate this realignment, shifting from policies of subsidized 
rental ‘social housing’ to home ownership and the financial products which go with them.  On 
another tack, the contracting and transaction-costs literature (as well as some case studies) 
suggests that left parties in more democratized setting may be more successful in supporting 
liberalization than their right counterparts.  The argument here is that the left will have more 
credibility than the right in the face of entrenched opposition to market opening (Cukierman 
and Tommassi 1998), and a range of circumstances may also render left liberalisation 
proposals easier to achieve.  On the one hand, the left may face lower aggregate levels of 
opposition from right or centre parties, and these parties’ traditional (business) constituencies 
are rather unlikely to seriously oppose left-government financial liberalisation proposals.  On 
the other hand, were a right government to propose it the left would most certainly mount 
serious opposition.  The left may be able to count on the support of their traditional 
constituencies despite the opposition of the latter to financial liberalization (htye have 
nowhere else to go), and may be more successful at persuading opposing constituencies to 
acquiesce, not least because of a willingness to employ policies of compensation.  Finally, left 
governments may seek to enhance their macroeconomic policy credibility in the international 
domain by embracing various forms of liberalization despite the opposition of their traditional 
supporters (who are unlikely to defect from them in the absence of serious alternatives). 
  12Both columns (4) and (5) consider the various possibilities focusing on levels of 
democracy interacted with simple levels, or incidence, of left and right governments (center 
governments as the excluded category).  Column (4) specifies democracy by taking the Polity 
IV measure of 10-point autocracy and 10-point democracy, with levels of democracy ranging 
from complete autarchy (-10) to complete democracy (10).  Column (5) specifies democracy 
more roughly, taking a value of 1 for all country-years where the above Polity score is above 
0.  As both specifications make clear, democratization significantly mutes the tendency of left 
governments to oppose financial liberalization.  Net of levels of economic development as 
well as all other controls, low levels of democracy creates conditions under which left 
governments tend to significantly oppose liberalization, and as levels of democracy rise this 
negative effect becomes weaker, such that at medium to high levels of democracy left parties 
are no longer associated with less financial liberalization or more closure.   
Focusing on the substantive effects suggested by the estimation in column (5), in non-
democratic settings (with a polity score of 0 or negative) moving from a year without left 
government to a year with left government leads to an increased chance of some degree of 
financial closure (negative change in financial openness index) by 4.6 percentage points (from 
.0138 to .0313 probability), and of zero change in financial openness by 12.8 percentage 
points (from a predicted probability of .697 to .825), and lowers the chance of financial 
liberalization by 14.6 percentage points (from a probability of .29 to a probability of .143).  
However, under more democratic settings (where polity scores are higher than zero), moving 
from non-left to left government predicts in the net a decrease in the chance of reversal by 
11.2 percentage points (from a predicted probability of .123 to .026) and of no change by 2.5 
percentage points (predicted chance of .824 to .804), and an increase in the chance of 
liberalization by 13.7 percentage points (from a probability of .034 to .171).  Such 
conditionally positive effects of left government, however, are only significant for the middle 
third of the full distribution of country-year variation in incidence of left government.   
In any event, these patterns suggest that democratization – perhaps the most obvious 
and general measure of the input side – will tend to diminish left government opposition to 
liberalization.  Even if partisanship and democracy appear to have few direct effects, thus, 
their  interaction in input-phase processes is good news for the chances of liberalization.   
These results are robust to all the Abiad and Mody specifications and to a range of alternative 
estimators and specifications, including an error correction model where RHS variables, 
including the interactions between democracy and partisanship, are taken in first differences 
and lags. 
  132.3. International support for free-market internationalism versus protectionist 
closure.  The final set of estimations in Table One concern the broad subjective embrace 
versus rejection of free market openness or internationalism, versus support for anti-capitalist 
regulation or closure.  Both the domestic and international level of such embrace and 
rejection affect the domestic thinking of a polity relevant to its subjective acceptance or 
rejection of financial liberalization in particular.  These all capture the possible input phase 
elements of financial reforms being explained – net of the kinds of institutional and 
partisanship conditions relevant to input.  Although domestic measures are the most obviously 
relevant to input, international voter support for or rejection of free market ideas is also 
relevant because it captures general influences on the domestic ideological climate which in 
turn likely influence a polity’s tastes for financial liberalization – the tastes of the broad 
public as well as elites.  Indeed, a recent study by Quinn and Toyoda (2007) finds that 
international levels of voter support for (post-) Communist parties tends to significantly 
decrease the chances that a polity introduces capital account liberalization, while international 
voter support for free-enterprise capitalism tends to increase chances of liberalization.   
Unfortunately, we have insufficient information to measure the levels of citizen 
support for free-market internationalism versus regulatory intervention and protectionism – 
not least because a number of country-years in the sample are non-democratic where polls or 
party information are lacking – something further research may partially redress.  But 
building on the technique Quinn and Toyoda use to gauge the influence of international 
ideology, we can find measures of international levels of voter support for free-market 
internationalism versus anti-capitalist closure.  Such voter support can be gauged using the 
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) dataset, which provides salient measures of party 
“support” for a range of substantive policy issues, based on content analysis of the party 
programs of political parties on a range of substantive policy issues for 25 countries since 
1945.
8   Based on the share of a party’s program supporting or opposing free markets or 
capitalism, one can then judge what this means for voters by multiplying the platform scores 
by the percentage of votes the relevant party received in the election.  One can then take the 
yearly averages for the inferred voter positions for all the countries in the sample to gauge the 
                                                 
8 The dataset provides salience measures of position-taking on a range of issues, where the level of support or 
opposition to a policy principle is gauged as the number of sentences or sentence fragments addressing such 
support or opposition, as a percentage of the total number of sentences or sentence fragments in the party 
manifesto. Higher values represent higher salience and/or support for a particular policy position 
  14general international climate on issues – position-taking that gauge input legitimacy from 
without.
9   
Relevant to the input phase of financial liberalization are a number of parameters in 
the CMP dataset.  Providing a more encompassing measure of support for markets than Quinn 
and Toyoda develop, we focus on a measure of net support for international free markets, 
representing a composite of the following elements:   
Free enterprise (per401 in the CMP dataset):  
Favourable mentions of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual enterprise  
over state and control systems; favourable mentions of private property rights,  
personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered individual enterprises”  
Protectionism: Negative (per407):   
Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative. 
Protectionism: Positive (per406):   
Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal  
markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions 
      Controlled Economy (per412): 
General need for direct government control of economy; control over prices, 
wages, rents, etc; state intervention into the economic system. 
       Nationalisation (per413):  
Favourable mentions of government ownership, partial or complete, including  
government ownership of land. 
(CMP Appendix III). 
 
From these elements we construct a composite representing support for free-market 
internationalism in the net:  net free-market internationalism=(per401+per407)-
(per406+per412+per413).  We then multiply the party-year scores by the percentage of votes 
gleaned in the relevant election, to generate each polity’s support for net free-market 
internationalism per country-year.  Since elections are not held yearly, we construct a 5-year 
moving average for each country-year to ensure that every country is in the estimates of 
yearly-varying voter positions.  The final step is to calculate the average for the whole 
international system by taking the unweighted average for all 25 countries per year.  This 
                                                 
9 One might also consider regionally-specific trends in voter support for free market openness, on the assumption 
that there are significant regional differences.  But the CMP data’s coverage does not fully allow this possibility.  
For instance, there are no African countries in the dataset. 
  15gives us the average international support for net free-market internationalism that we can 
then merge with the Abiad and Mody dataset.   Figure Two shows how this measure of voter 
support is volatile across years, but tends in general to rise – broadly in line with rising levels 
of financial openness in the net.
10
 
[[Figure Two about here]] 
 
  We also considered a range of alternative measures of support or opposition to free 
markets and/or internationalism using the same technique applied to other elements of the 
CMP dataset.  These include: each of the above components separately; support and 
opposition to international organizations and internationalism, without making explicit 
reference to political-economic openness (per108-per109); support for Marxist ideology 
(per404); and support for post-communist parties.  We also considered alternative measures 
of international support for or opposition to free-market internationalism, including use of raw 
scores of party proportions on these issues; or weighting the scores by share of parliamentary 
seats rather than votes.   
Although the results are virtually identical regardless of the particular measure one 
uses, columns (6) through (8) in Table One show the results for net free-market 
internationalism.  Columns (6) and (7) show how this measure of international voter support 
for free-market internationalism – measured first in the net (as specified above) and as 
absolute support for free enterprise and free trade (per401+per407) – correlates significantly 
positively with changes in financial openness.  Importantly, we can also see in both 
specifications that these external voter sentiments also tend to reduce the influence of the 
catch-up dynamic emphasized in the Abiad and Mody study.  And column (8) in any event 
shows that the international voter support for free-market internationalism  also interacts 
significantly with this catch-up dynamic: at low levels of support for free-market 
internationalism, countries that lag far behind the regional leader in financial openness are not 
likely to be significantly spurred to pursue financial liberalization; but at high levels of such 
internationalism, the urge to catch up becomes significantly more positive.   
Substantively, the effects of international voter embrace of free-market 
internationalism are quite modest.  If we consider the model in column (6), and 
                                                 
10 Tracking net free-market internationalism with changes in financial openness yields clear correlation amidst 
volatility of the former, and is stronger if one takes lagged values of internationalism (not shown but available 
upon request). 
  16counterfactually predict the change in chance of liberalization as we move from the 25
th to the 
90
th percentile in the sample-distribution’s variation in net free-market internationalism (from 
a score of -2.66 to 33.6), we see a decrease in the chance that a country reverses course on 
financial openness by 1.3 percentage points (from .03 to .017 probability of reversal), and a 
decrease by 7.5 percentage points in the chance of no change in openness (from .82 to .745 
probability), and an increase of 8.7 percentage points in the chance of liberalization (from a 
probability of .15 to a probability of .24).  All these effects, however, are significant at a .05 
level throughout the sample distribution.  And they are also robust to alternative estimators in 
the Abiad and Mody study, and to the exclusion of the US interest-rate dummy (another 
annually-changing variable) or the inclusion of yearly dummies.  And the same holds for the 
other measures of support or opposition to free market internationalism. 
 
3. Output  
The output phase concerns the substantive and ongoing affects of initial input-phase 
policy change on the perceived interests of stakeholders, whatever their involvement in or 
acceptance of the policy change.  This is often more relevant than the input phase to our 
understanding of the longer run sustainability of the outcomes produced by liberalisation.  But 
it is also relevant to shorter-term policy decisions towards financial liberalization (or 
reversals) as discrete triggers in a cumulative dynamic.  In other words, the output phase is 
central to what Abiad and Mody characterise as ‘a learning process that shaped and sustained 
reforms’ (p. 67).  Relevant to the output side are all the downstream effects, real and 
perceived, of the successive levels/reversals of financial openness actually implemented as 
policy – hence, the relevance of levels of growth, unemployment, inequality, poverty, and the 
actual or perceived degree to which these are affected by financial openness.  In our 
reckoning, however, a range of policy conditions interact with financial openness/closure to 
shape the sustainability of a policy trend in the output phase – most obviously government 
and social policies that address the distributional and/or equity concerns of stakeholders 
potentially affected by financial liberalization.  The point builds on the well-established 
hypothesis that the provision of some forms of policy compensation can help foster support 
for international economic openness (Polanyi 1944; Ruggie 1983; Rodrik 1997).  Studies of 
international trade openness have most fully investigated this hypothesis principally in the 
context of public opinion surveys, but also through work on party manifestos (Hays et.al. 
2005; Burgoon 2007; Rodrik, Mayda and O’Rourke 2006).  But there is also some qualitative 
work to support the claim with respect to financial openness (e.g. Bordo et.al. 1999).  Our 
  17final set of estimations on the politicaleconomy of financial liberalization considers how and 
whether both national and international sources of such compensation make a difference to 
financial openness.  Table Two summarizes the results. 
 
[[Table Two about here]] 
 
  3.1. Domestic social policy compensation.  Columns (1) through (4) consider the role 
of various measures of domestic government spending on financial liberalization.  Although 
some have argued that all faces of the public economy are relevant to addressing the social 
risks to individuals and constituencies of economic openness, others have argued that not all 
faces of government spending are equally relevant to such risks (c.f. Rodrik 1997; Burgoon 
2001).  The four estimations consider these possibilities by focusing on four measures of 
government spending, more or less targeted at particular issues relevant to the risks of 
openness.  All are measured as spending as a share of national GDP, and all are lagged by one 
year to address the time it takes for polities to respond to the potential insurance-effects of 
such “compensation” and to adjust for possible endogeneity (given that financial 
liberalization or reversals plausibly influence spending levels).   
Column (1) focuses on government consumption, a measure that has the best 
coverage, but excludes the many social transfer programs clearly relevant to the risks of 
openness (Penn World Tables 6.1).  Perhaps this is why the effect is insignificant, though 
positively signed as expected.  A somewhat better measure is total government spending or 
revenue, which includes such transfers, but also includes many other government spending 
programs many of which are irrelevant to – or perhaps even likely to undermine – support for 
financial liberalization (POFED database 2003).
11  Although the results are not shown, this 
measure also yields positive but statistically insignificant results.   
Columns (2) through (4) consider measures of the spending that come somewhat 
closer to the social policies thought most relevant to the social risks of openness.   
Unfortunately, measures of social policy with reasonable coverage of the country-years in the 
Abiad and Mody dataset are hard to find, and we can only unearth quality measures for social 
security transfers and for public health expenditures.  The former might be expected to have 
                                                 
11 For instance, this measure includes military expenditures.  Such expenditures may play a social insurance role, 
but may also capture the military priorities, or conflict footing, of polities, tending to decrease chances of 
financial liberalization or openness.  As an empirical matter, measures of military expenditure actually tend to 
statistically and substantively significantly decrease chances of liberalization (results not shown but available 
upon request). 
  18direct relevance for risks of economic openness, but in developing countries such transfers are 
often heavily skewed to public pension programs and targeted at employees in the formal, 
public economy.  As such, they often do little to indemnify more generally vulnerable 
workers in more exposed sectors from the risks of financial or other kinds of economic 
openness.  Column (2) shows the effect of such transfers, and following expectation we can 
see that the effects are positive but statistically insignificant.   
Health spending, on the other hand, has often provided stronger and more evenly 
dispersed benefits for workers in both developing countries, but also developed countries (as 
the current debate in the US lays bare).  Higher public spending on health, hence, might have 
a more meaningful compensatory effect for workers facing the vagaries of open financial 
markets.  Columns (3) shows that measures including such health expenditures do, indeed, 
significantly increase the chances of financial liberalization.  And column (4) shows that the 
positive effect of combined spending on health and social security transfers tends also to 
statistically significantly increase financial liberalization.  The substantive effects of such 
spending, based on the model in column (3), appear to be rather substantial.  Moving from the 
25
th to the 75
th percentile in the sample distribution of health spending – the equivalent of 
moving from a setting where a country spends 0.7 percent of GDP on health benefits to one 
where it spends 2.5 percent of GDP on such benefits – decreases the chance that a country 
will undergo a reversal of financial openness by 3 percentage points (probability of .051 to 
.022), and also decreases the chance by 8.6 percentage points of there being no change in such 
openness.  And such an increase in health spending predicts an increase of 11.5 percentage 
points in the chance that a government will libereralize (probability .103 to .218). 
  3.2. Foreign Aid received:  Finally, columns (5) through (8) suggest that the role of 
compensation in increasing the sustainability of the output phase of financial liberalization 
may extend not only to some domestic social spending, but also to the levels of aid assistance 
that a country might receive from international sources.  Such aid may come with strings 
attached that might be relevant to financial openness regardless of their substantive, 
compensatory effects:  if aid is made conditional upon economic changes such as financial 
market opening, then we would expect the effect of aid to be positive.  But it is also plausible 
that international aid of various kinds, whether or not it comes with conditionality, may well 
play some compensatory role, as it were substituting for the shortcomings of domestic social 
policy compensation in less developed countries.  Both bilateral initiatives of many Northern 
economies, particularly European countries, and multilateral-aid initiatives channelled 
through the European Union or World Bank auspices, have explicitly focused on a range of 
  19programmes that provide direct (health programs) and indirect (infrastructure programs) 
social insurance role for those facing risks of economic openness.  If so, one might 
hypothesize that, net of conditionality conditions, such compensation from without might also 
increase chances of financial liberalization.   
  Columns (5) through (7) show that due either to the compensatory or other roles such 
aid might entail, higher levels of bilateral aid (Column 5), multilateral aid (Column 6), and 
combined-multilateral-bilateral aid (Column 7) tend to significantly contribute to cumulative 
and sustainable phases of financial liberalization.  All three measures are expressed as shares 
of GDP, and all are lagged by one year to try to address possible endogeneity and (even 
harder to address) the possibility of policy conditionality in the granting of aid.  As can be 
seen from the coefficients, all three have a positive, modestly statistically-significant effect on 
changes in financial openness.  And as can be seen by the coefficients, which can be directly 
compared because they are in the same units, this effect is strongest for multilateral aid.  
Substantively, however, the effects are quite modest.  Moving from the sample’s 50
th to the 
90
th percentile in multilateral aid received – equivalent of moving from a level of aid at .07 
percent of GDP to a level of 12.6 percent of GDP – decreases the chance of reversal by .8 
percentage points (from .025 to .017 probability) and of no change by 4.5 percentage points 
(from .84 to .796 probability), and increases the chance of liberalization by 5.3 percentage 
points (.135 probability to .188 probability of liberalization).   
Interestingly, such positive effects of foreign aid received for liberalization appear not 
to be mediated by varying levels of ex ante financial openness or of catch-up dynamics 
(degree to which a country lags-behind lead-liberalizer of its region).  As was also clear from 
the previous columns in Table Two, foreign aid also does not tend to have effects at the 
expense of the general catch-up effect, suggesting simply that this aspect of foreign influence 
might matter more than the spatial effects of lagging-behind regional leaders.  But as Column 
(8) shows, foreign aid received does not significantly interact either the catch-up parameter or 
with ex ante liberalization.  Higher aid levels do tend to diminish rather than increase the 
catch-up dynamic, though not significantly.  And the interaction with lagged financial 
openness is virtually nil.  What this all suggests is that foreign aid may well be a significant 
force in spurring liberalization, though not in ways sensitive to either existing openness or 
other regional influences.  These reported effects, again, are robust to the other estimation 
specifications in the Abiad and Mody study, and also to a range of other controls – including, 
for instance, domestic compensation measures also on the RHS. 
 
  204. Conclusion  
This paper provides new evidence on how domestic and international dimensions of 
both the input and output phases of economic globalization help explain financial 
liberalization across countries and time.  Our findings challenge the Abiad and Mody (2005) 
conclusion that such liberalization has little to do with political variables.  In particular, our 
account proves more sensitive to explaining the substantial observable cross-country 
variations in the extent, phasing, and pace of financial liberalisation over time.  It does so by 
unpicking the somewhat general political variables employed in the Abiad and Mody study 
(ideological affinity, regime type), applying more subtle and interactive measures to their 
index of financial liberalisation.  Our own investigation suggests that political variables 
representing the domestic and international dimensions of both the input and output phases of 
financial liberalization matter significantly, statistically if not always substantively, to the 
short-term decisions of polities to undertake financial reforms (the triggers).  The domestic 
and international input elements that appear to matter empirically include: (i) shifts to left 
partisanship and (ii) the interaction of left partisanship and democracy (iii) international voter 
support for free-market internationalism, as opposed to anti-capitalist closure.  Sources of 
output legitimacy that are empirically important include: (i) some targeted social policies, 
particularly in the area of health spending, and (ii) multilateral and bilateral aid.  The latter 
might not only spur liberalization through the conditionality sometimes attached to such aid, 
but may also serve a compensatory role that constitutes important international sources of 
output legitimacy.   
In the narrowest sense, our findings are meant to provide a partial corrective to the 
conclusions reached by the Abiad and Mody’s study.  Our message, in this sense, is simply 
that political variables matter more and differently than their empirical findings would have 
us believe.  However, we argue in addition that our study into the input and output phases of 
policy reform constitutes a sound framework in which to understand the political economy of 
both liberalisation episodes and their longer-run sustainability.  In this sense, our approach is 
also a reminder of a larger research agenda into the politics of globalization than the present 
study allows.  We believe that understanding the political economy of governance under 
conditions of financial liberalisation requires an account of the complex power-political 
interactions of a wide range of state and market actors in both formal-institutional and more 
informal, public-private settings – well beyond the kinds left-right partisan conditions which 
we discussed above.  Much financial sector policy-making is elite policy making where 
decisions are taken in relatively closed forums involving a limited community of public and 
  21private institutions in the financial sector. In this sense further work should focus not just on 
broader institutional-electoral or partisan specifications as they interact with policy change, 
but also on these more back-room settings with their potential for mutual clientelism and 
policy capture. 
We also believe that the features of democratic involvement or subjective support for 
more or less open markets that are key to understanding the input side go well beyond the still 
simple measures of broad democracy and international voter attitudes discussed above.  More 
obviously, the dimensions of the output phase and of the legitimacy and sustainability of 
liberalisation are much more complicated than the simple role of compensatory social and aid 
provisions highlighted above – involving the gamut of policies and informal practices that 
might diminish the distributional costs and system risks of open markets.  These policies and 
practices are particularly relevant if we wish better to understand the eventual long-term 
stability of openness and not just the relatively short-term perspective the present paper has 
investigated.  Research into this long-run political economy of financial liberalisation is 
central to developing a better understanding of the ongoing process of cross-border economic 
integration and its governance. 
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Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Financial Liberalization Index. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by country.  Fixed effects for 
35 countries not shown. 
*** denotes significance at the 1-percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; * denotes significance at the 10-percent level. 
 
  - 3 - 
Table Two:  Output Legitimacy and Financial Liberalization 
(DV=Change in Financial openness (Δ FLit-1)) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Government consumption it-1 0.010         
  ( 0 . 2 4 )
( 1 . 1 7 )
1 . 9 7 ) * *
- 4 . 1 5 0
( 1 . 1 7 )
- 1 . 6 3 5
( 0 . 5 3 )
         
Social security transfers it-1  10.764        
            
Health expenditures it-1   49.310       
    (3.29)***       
Total social transfers it-1    25.329      
     (       
Bilateral aid received it-1     2.971     
      (1.87)*     
Multilateral aid received it-1      3.140   5.504 
       (2.40)**   (3.59)*** 
Total aid received it-1       2.612   
        (3.09)***   
Multil.aidit-1 * Catch-upit          
           
Multil.aidit-1 * FLit-1          
           
Leftist Governmentit -0.085 -0.074 -0.177 -0.263 -0.298 -0.220 -0.288 -0.229 
  (0.23) (0.15) (0.34) (0.47) (0.67) (0.49) (0.64) (0.51) 
  - 4 -Rightist Governmentit -0.079  0.196 0.223 0.148 -0.098  -0.018  -0.057  -0.015 
  (0.22) (0.42) (0.51) (0.31) (0.23) (0.04) (0.13) (0.03) 
Financial openness (FLit-1)  6.601 8.123 8.569 8.629 5.598 5.374 5.007 5.245 
  (4.19)*** (3.51)*** (3.45)*** (3.61)*** (2.84)*** (2.88)*** (2.62)*** (2.60)*** 
Financial openness sq. ((FLit-1)
2)  -9.720 -9.899 -10.186  -9.995 -7.970 -7.699 -7.838 -7.600 
  (3.75)*** (3.43)*** (3.39)*** (3.48)*** (3.02)*** (2.93)*** (2.94)*** (2.89)*** 
 FLit-1 * Y it-1   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (2.37)**  (1.89)*  (0.73) (0.95) (2.42)**  (2.41)**  (2.46)**  (2.33)** 
Catch-up (Reg.lead_FLit-1 - FLit-1)  2.063 3.318 3.369 3.354 3.426 3.343 3.035 3.424 
  (1.67)*  (1.99)** (1.94)*  (2.07)** (2.40)** (2.41)** (2.18)** (2.42)** 
Currency Crisisit 0.447 0.536 0.412 0.474 0.297 0.364 0.346 0.382 
  (1.93)*  (1.59) (1.17) (1.37) (1.08) (1.29) (1.25) (1.33) 
Banking Crisisit -1.017 -1.069 -1.180 -1.219 -0.991 -0.976 -1.000 -0.979 
  (2.94)*** (2.47)**  (2.80)*** (2.97)*** (2.47)**  (2.36)**  (2.43)**  (2.38)** 
Recessionit -0.022  0.524 0.498 0.534 0.310 0.300 0.327 0.294 
  (0.06) (1.41) (1.44) (1.51) (0.75) (0.72) (0.78) (0.70) 
High Inflationit -0.450 -1.099 -1.215 -1.117 -0.925 -0.940 -0.829 -0.953 
  (0.75) (1.39) (1.37) (1.35) (1.02) (1.04) (0.91) (1.05) 
First Year in Officeit 0.254 0.088 0.091 0.071 0.287 0.302 0.273 0.289 
  (0.94) (0.27) (0.28) (0.22) (0.87) (0.91) (0.83) (0.87) 
IMF programit 0.362 0.004 0.036 -0.010  0.339 0.346 0.296 0.353 
  (1.33) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (1.09) (1.13) (0.94) (1.16) 
US Interest Ratet -0.089 -0.069 -0.052 -0.061 -0.108 -0.104 -0.107 -0.100 
  (2.03)**  (1.51) (1.05) (1.28) (2.06)**  (1.99)**  (2.04)**  (1.90)* 
Fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  805 550 550 550 626 626 626 626 
  - 5 -  - 6 -
Log  likelihood  -730.1 -498.7 -494  -495.5 -520.1 -520.3 -518.8 -520.1 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in the Financial Liberalization Index. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by country.  Fixed effects for 
35 countries not shown. 
*** denotes significance at the 1-percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5-percent level; * denotes significance at the 10-percent level.  
 
Figure Two:   








































































































Source:  Comparative Manifestos Project dataset (own calculations); and Abiad and Mody (2005) 